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A GENERALIZATION OF A CLASSICAL MODEL IN
CONTRACT THEORY: THE AGENT BEHAVIOR
FRANCISCO GUTIERREZ, CAMILO ARGOTY, AND STEFANY MORENO
Abstract. We present a first approximation of agent behaviour in a general-
ized model in contract theory. This model relaxes some of the the assumptions
of one of the classical models allowing to include a broader range of agents.
We introduce the motivation for the agent and reinterpret the classical defini-
tion of risk perception. Besides, we analyze different scenarios for the relation
between the effort exerted by the agent and the probability that he gets an
especfic result.
1. Introduction
1.1. The classical model. A contract is an agreement between two or more par-
ties that defines a set of mutual obligations for them. In the classical model the
contractual relation is established between two parties: the principal and the agent
[1]. Each party has to make one decision: The principal decides the wage w that the
agent will receive according to the monetary result x obtained from the contractual
relation, and the agent decides how much effort e he will exert. It is worthy to note
that the monetary result x does not depend only on the effort exerted by the agent
but also on a random variable associated with all possible external conditions that
affect the final result and are not controlled by any of the parties [1].
The relation between the variables e, x and w and the utility of each party is
defined by an utility function. This function is specific for each player and expresses
his preferences with respect to the risk. The utility function for the principal is
B(x−w). It is assumed that B′ > 0, which means that the utility of the principal
increases with x and decreases with w and B′′ ≤ 0 which means that it is concave
[4]. The second derivative will determine the degree of risk aversion of the principal:
if B′′ < 0 he is risk averse, if B′′ = 0 he is risk neutral and if B′′ > 0 he is risk-
seeking.
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On the other hand, the utility function for the agent is defined by U(w, e) =
u(w) − v(e). It is assumed that, u′(w) > 0, u′′(w) ≤ 0, v′(e) > 0 and v′′(e) ≥ 0.
The assumptions about u(w) imply that the utility u increases with w and that
the agent is either risk-averse or risk-neutral in terms of his payoff [4]. From v(e),
it means that u decreases with e with the marginal disutility of the effort not
decreasing.
Using the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem to maximize the utility of the principal re-
stricted to the agent’s participation condition -which is having an expected utility
higher than his reservation utility- it is possible to know how the contract should
be designed according to the risk preferences of both parties. If one of the parties is
risk averse the other should assume all the risk in the contractual relation, while if
both are risk-averse they have to share the risk according to their degree of aversion
[4].
1.2. Limitations of the classical model. First, note that it is assumed that the
utility of the agent always increases with the wage received and always decreases
with the effort exerted. This assumption is valid in the context of agents who make
a repetitive work (e.g. machine operators), but it does not hold for all type of
agents. It is possible that for an agent it is a loss not to exert any effort, i.e. the
agent has an inner need of working. Even more, there may be an interval of efforts
for which the agent has some utility in exerting them (e.g. volunteers, suicide
bombers). Indeed, the initial motivation of this work was to extend the classical
model of contract theory to the case of this kind of agents.
Second, note that the other main assumption of the classical model is that the
optimization is made only by one of the parties. Usually, that party is the principal
who is the one designing the contract. As in the case of the Kuhn-Tucker maximiza-
tion mentioned before, the agent just imposes some restrictions and the principal
maximizes with respect to them. We consider that there is no reason to assume
that just one party is maximizing. By doing the maximization for the agent first,
it is possible to use other type of restrictions while doing the maximization for the
principal. So, we replaced the participation and incentive compatibility restrictions
for maximization restrictions for the agent.
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2. Proposed model
2.1. The Principal-agent game. We state the problem in the following way.
We have two players: Agent (A) and Principal (B). Principal wants the agent to
produce certain good x among a set X of possible goods x1, . . . , xn
Definition 2.1. A contract is a function w : X → R. Equivalently, a contract is a
vector w¯ = (w1, . . . , wn), such that wi = w(xi)
In the first move, principal chooses a contract w¯. Then, agent chooses a level of
effort e to exert at working. In the third step nature chooses a good xi0 according
to a probability distribution pi(e) on X that depends on the agent A and the effort
e exerted by him, where e ∈ [emin, emax]
It is worthy to analyze this probability distribution pi(e). This distribution is
given by pi(e) = {p1(e), . . . , pn(e)}, where pi(e) is the probability for the agent A
to produce the good xi when A exerts an effort e.
Definition 2.2. The function P (A) such that P (A) = pi(e) is called the profile of
agent A
In the last step, principal and agent receive payments piE(x,w) and piA(w, e)
respectively.
The goal of this section is solve this game by backward induction. We suppose
by a first approach, that the distribution function pi(e) is known to both agent and
principal.
In order to start this backward induction we need to analyze payment functions
for agent and principal.
2.2. Payment for agent. We model payment function for agent by introducing
two new functions u(w) and v(e) this way:
piw¯A(w, e) = u(w)− v(e),
where, following tradition, u(w) is an utility function depending on the wage w
received by the agent according to the contract w¯ selected by the principal, and
v(e) is a loss to the agent cause by the exertion of an effort e.
We propose some changes in function v(e). First of all, we consider that it is
not necessary to consider it a loss all the times. We assume that it is possible that
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for an agent it is a loss not to exert any effort, i.e. the agent has an inner need of
working. Even more, there may be an interval of efforts for which the agent has
some utility in exerting them. The usual agent become a particular case of this
kind of function. The main (perhaps the only) characteristic of v is that v′′ > 0.
Definition 2.3. Let A be an agent with payment function piw¯A(w, e) = u(w)− v(e)
and profile P (A). Then the term
∑
i=1,...,n pi(e)u(wi)− v(e) is called the payment
expectation for the agent A and is denoted by Ew¯A(e). Note that the function E
w¯
A
depends on the contract selected by the principal w¯ and it has only one parameter:
e. Once the principal selects the contract, the payment expectation function of the
agent is established. Then, by modifying his effort -which is the only variable he
can control-, the agent maximizes his expectation utility.
Let A be an agent, let Ew¯A(e) his benefit expectation function, and w¯ a contract.
The derivative,
∂Ew¯A
∂e
is called the motivation function of agent A under contract w¯ and is denoted by
Mtw¯A(e). Also, the derivative,
∂Mtw¯A
∂e
is called the persistence function of agent A under contract w¯ and is denoted by
Prstw¯A(e). In case this function is negative, we can replace it by its opposite
−
∂Mtw¯A
∂e
which is called the transience function of agent A under contract w¯ and is denoted
by Trw¯A(e)
2.3. The agent’s problem. Following backward induction, supposing that Prin-
cipal E has chosen a contract w¯, the agent has to solve the following optimization
problem:
max
e∈[emin,emax]
( ∑
i=1,...,n
pi(e)u(wi)− v(e)
)
In other words,
max
e∈[emin,emax]
Ew¯A(e)
This maximization problem take us to three possible scenarios for e∗:
1) e∗ ∈ (emin, emax)
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By elementary calculus, the agent either chooses e∗ such that
∂Ew¯A
∂e
= 0
which is equivalent to saying that the agent either chooses rejects the contract or
chooses an e∗ such that Mtw¯A(e
∗) = 0 and
Prstw¯A(e
∗) < 0 or equivalently, Trw¯A(e
∗) > 0
2) e∗ = emin which is E
w¯
A(emin) ≥ E
w¯
A(e) for all e ∈ [emin, emax]
3) e∗ = emax which is E
w¯
A(emax) ≥ E
w¯
A(e) for all e ∈ [emin, emax]
Note that these scenarios are not exclusive i.e. it is possible that there is more
than one maximum.
2.3.1. The Risk interpretation. We introduce one main shift to the usual way of
treating risk: The position with respect to risk depends on the utility expectation
function of the agent, Ew¯A(e) and not only on his utility with respect to the payment
u(w). As it was explained before Ew¯A(e) is defined by the contract. So, if the
position with respect to risk depends on Ew¯A(e), this means that it is not an inherent
characteristic of the agent but it changes depending on the type of contract offered
by the principal. In other words, the same agent can have different positions with
respect to risk for different type of contracts.
Classical risk interpretation
As it was mentioned before, in the classical risk interpretation the position of
the agent with respect to risk depends on the sign of u′′, which is constant for
the agent. Let us consider each case, and its relation to the three maximization
scenarios proposed above:
(1) If the agent is risk- averse Prstw˜A(e) < 0 for every value of e, so he is necessary
in the first maximization scenario. This corresponds to classical agents that exert an
amount of effort that is in (emin, emax). In other words, they maximize their utility
working (which means e > emin) but not to his maximum potential ( e > emax).
(2) If the agent is risk-seeking Prstw˜A(e) > 0 for every value of e, so it is not
possible for him to find a maximum in (emin, emax) which means that he is either
in the second or the third case of the maximization problem. This implies that if
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the agent is always risk-seeking he will go for extreme values for the effort i.e. emin
or emax
(3) If the agent is risk-neutral Prstw˜A(e) = 0 which means that his expectation
utility function is a straight line, which is classical result in contract theory. Note
that the line can be an horizontal line, or it can have a slope different from 0. In the
first case, the agent is indifferent to the al possible outcomes obtained by exerting
any e ∈ [emin, emax]. In the second case, it means that the only maximization
scenarios possible for him are the second and the third. In other words, he can only
find a maximum for his utility in {emin, emax}.
3. Initial Results
3.1. Invisible effort. The first case that we analyze is when is not possible for the
principal to determine the effort exerted by the agent. This is a typical information
asymmetry in contract theory and can be modeled by considering the function
pi(e). Let us consider the more extreme case i.e. when the result obtained by the
agent does not depend on his effort. In terms of pi(e) this is pi(e) = pi for every
e ∈ [emin, emax].
In this scenario, the utility expectation function is Ew¯A =
∑
i=1,...,n piu(wi)−v(e).
As the first term is constant, differentiating by e we get Mtw¯A(e) = −v
′(e), which
means that in this scenario the agent will only minimize his disutility with respect
to effort. Since in terms of the result the efforts are equivalent, the agent will choose
the effort that implies the smallest disutility. So, he will be motivated to increase his
effort just by an intrinsic need of working. Besides, we have Prstw¯A(e) = −v
′′(e). As
it was explained before v(e) is assumed to be a concave function. Then, Ew¯A = −v(e)
is convex and −v′′(e) < 0. This implies that when the effort is invisible for the
principal, the agent is risk-averse with respect to it. In other words, the agent will
not take any risk by increasing the amount of effort exerted as he will not increase
the probability of getting a better result.
Note that the previous analysis can be extended to a case in which the function
pi(e) is not a constant but it is almost independent of the effort (or changes very
slightly with it). Actually, these are the type of functions that could exist in a real
context.
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3.2. Two possible outcomes. Let us consider the case in which there are just
two possible results x1 (good result) and x2 (bad result) for the work exerted by
the agent. As p1(e) + p2(e) = 1 for any e, we can consider only the function p1(e).
Let us assume that there is a linear relation between the probability of getting
x1 and the effort exerted by the agent. Then, p1(e) = Ce + h with C and h such
that 0 ≤ p1(emin), p1(emax) ≤ 1. Then, the utility expectation function is E
w¯
A =
∑2
i=1 pi(e)u(wi)− v(e). Differentiating by e we get Mt
w˜
A(e) = C(u(w1)− u(w2))−
v′(e). This implies that the there is a maximum when C(u(w1) − u(w2)) = v
′(e).
Since it is assumed that the function v′(e) is concave, its derivative increases when
e increases. From the previous equation, C and u(w1) − u(w2) are proportional
to v′(e) and then hold a direct relation with e. If C increases, the probability
of getting the good result by increasing the effort is higher. This explains why
there is a motivation for the agent to exert a higher effort. On the other side, if
there is a ig difference between the utility received with each one of the wages, it
is also profitable for him to increase his effort. Besides, Prstw˜A(e) = −v
′′(e) Since,
−v′′(e) < 0 the agent is risk-averse with respect to e.
Note that this means that in terms of risk aversion this agent is equivalent to the
one in a situation of invisible effort. His risk perception only involves the disutility
for exerting e and not the potential utility generated by w. Then, in these scenarios
the agent will always be risk-averse. Indeed, the only way in which an agent can
be risk-seeking is if there is a non linear relation between e and p.
4. Conclusions
It was shown that, by generalizing the classic model of contract theory, it is
possible to include a broader type of agents and still get the same conclusions about
the effect of risk preferences in the contractual relation. Moreover, we showed that
the agent’s motivation is a key factor in the contractual relation that is usually
ignored in the classical contract theory model. The future direction of this work
consists in including information asymmetries between the principal and the agent.
This will be done by using information theory to deal with the unknown information
in the contractual relation.
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